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RELAXING THE STANDARD FOR COURT-ORDERED
DISCOVERY IN AID OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
INTRODUCTION
Aware of the important role that discovery plays in pre-trial prepa-
ration, parties have requested courts to grant discovery in aid of
commercial arbitration.' Most courts, however, fearful that pre-
hearing disclosure will hamper the arbitral process, have imposed a
test of strict necessity.2 This test is satisfied when a party can demon-
1. See Willenken, The Often Overlooked Use of Discovery in Aid of Arbitration
and the Spread of the New York Rule to Federal Common Law, 35 Bus. Lawyer 173,
173 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Willenken I]; Page, Pretrial Discovery and Arbitra-
tion, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 15, 1975, at 1, col. 1. There are several ways for parties to an
arbitration to obtain discovery. Ordinarily parties voluntarily exchange information
before the hearing. Committee on Arbitration, Committee Report, The Use of Dis-
covery in Arbitration, 33 Rec. 231, 235 n.X, (1978); Willenken, Discovery in Aid of
Arbitration, 6 Litig. 16, 16 (1980). Parties also may provide for discovery rules in
their arbitration agreement. Willenken, I, supra, at 184-86; see, e.g., Mobil Oil
Indonesia Inc. v. Asamera Oil Ltd., 43 N.Y.2d 276, 280-81, 372 N.E.2d 21, 22-23,
401 N.Y.S.2d 186, 187-88 (1977); Local 99, ILGWU v. Charise Sportswear Co., 44
Misc. 2d 913, 915, 255 N.Y.S.2d 282, 284 (Sup. Ct. 1964). In the absence of mutual
agreement, a party must find other ways to compel an opponent to disclose needed
material. To do this, he must apply either to the arbitrator or to the courts. Arbitra-
tors, however, lack the common-law right to compel discovery, Tobey v. Bristol, 23
F. Cas. 1313, 1320 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065), and few states have statutes
empowering arbitrators to order discovery. See Cal. Civ. Prod. Code § 1283.05(a)
(West Supp. 1981); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 5-407(b) (1975); Tex. Stat. Ann. art. 230(B)
(Vernon 1973). The final way to obtain discovery is by court order. In contrast to the
arbitrator, courts do have the common-law right to compel pre-arbitral discovery.
See Wheeling Steel Corp. v. American Rolling Mill Co., 82 F.2d 97, 98-99 (6th Cir.
1936); C.F. Simmonin's Sons, Inc. v. American Can Co., 22 F. Supp. 784, 786 (E.D.
Pa. 1938); Puget Sound Nay. Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 56 F.2d 605, 606 (N.D.
Wash. 1932); Lutz Eng'g Co. v. Sterling Eng'g & Constr.. Co., 112 R.I. 605, 609,
314 A.2d 8, 10 (1974). In some states the courts have the statutory power to grant
discovery in aid of arbitration. E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-412 (1981); N.Y. Civ.
Prac. Law § 3102(c) (McKinney 1970); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7309(a) (Purdon
1981).
2. E.g., Burton v. Bush, 614 F.2d 389, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1980) (dictum); Coastal
States Trading, Inc. v. Zenith Nay. S.A., 446 F. Supp. 330, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Levin v. Ripple Twist Mills, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 876, 880 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Bergen
Shipping Co. v. Japan Marine Servs., Ltd., 386 F. Supp. 430, 435 n.8 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); Ferro Union Corp. v. SS Ionic Coast, 43 F.R.D. 11, 13-14 (S.D. Tex. 1967);
Penn Tanker Co. v. C.H.Z. Rolimpex Warszawa, 199 F. Supp. 716, 718 (S.D.N.Y.
1961); Commerical Solvents Corp. v. Louisiana Liquid Fertilizer Co., 20 F.R.D.
359, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Cavanaugh v. McDonnell & Co., 357 Mass. 452, 455-56,
258 N.E.2d 561, 563-64 (1970); Katz v. Burkin, 3 A.D.2d 238, 239, 160 N.Y.S.2d
159, 160-61 (1957) (per curiam); Lutz Eng'g Co. v. Sterling Eng'g & Constr. Co.,
112 R.I. 605, 607, 314 A.2d 8, 11 (1974); Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. Commercial
Metals Co., 93 Wash. 2d 199, 203-04, 607 P.2d 856, 858 (1980) (en banc).
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strate "extraordinary circumstances," 3 such as a danger that the infor-
mation sought will no longer be available by the time the arbitral
hearing begins. 4
The restriction on the availability of discovery was intended to
preserve arbitration as an alternative to court litigation.5 Arbitration
originated as an informal and voluntary forum, 6 designed to provide a
3. E.g., Coastal States Trading, Inc. v. Zenith Nay. S.A., 446 F. Supp. 330, 342
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Bergen Shipping Co. v. Japan Marine Servs., Ltd., 386 F. Supp.
430, 435 & n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Ferro Union Corp. v. SS Ionic Coast, 43 F.R.D. 11,
13-14 (S.D. Tex. 1967); Penn Tanker Co. v. C.H.Z. Rolimpex, \%'arszawa, 199 F.
Supp. 716, 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Louisiana Liquid
Fertilizer Co., 20 F.R.D. 359, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Katz v. Burkin, 3 A.D.2d 238,
238-39, 160 N.Y.S.2d 159, 160-61 (1957) (per curiam); Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v.
Commercial Metals Co., 93 Wash. 2d 199, 204, 607 P.2d 856, 858-59 (1980) (en
banc).
4. E.g., Coastal States Trading, Inc. v. Zenith Nay. S.A., 446 F. Supp. 330, 342
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Bergen Shipping Co. v. Japan Marine Servs., Ltd., 386 F. Supp.
430, 435 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1974): Ferro Union Corp. v. SS Ionic Coast, 43 F.R.D. 11, 14
(S.D. Tex. 1967).
5. E.g., Penn Tanker Co. v. C.H.Z. Rolimpex, Warszawa, 199 F. Supp. 716,
718 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Louisiana Liquid Fertilizer Co.,
20 F.R.D. 359, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1957): McRae v. Superior Court, 221 Cal. App. 2d
166, 169, 34 Cal. Rptr. 346, 349 (1963): St. Germain v. Motor Vehicle Accid.
Indemnif. Corp., 20 A.D.2d 648, 649, 246 N.Y.S.2d 372, 373-74 (1964): Katz v.
Burkin, 3 A.D.2d 238, 239, 160 N.Y.S.2d 159, 161 (1957) (per curiam): Stiller
Fabrics v. Michael Saphier Assocs., 1 Misc. 2d 787, 787-88, 148 N.Y.S.2d 591, 592
(Sup. Ct. 1956).
6. See M. Domke, The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration, § 1.01, at
1 (1968); Boskey, A History of Commercial Arbitration in New Jersey (pt. I), 8 Rut.-
Cam. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1976); Emerson, History of Arbitration Practice and Law, 19
Clev. St. L. Rev. 155, 157 (1970); Jones, Blind Alan's Buff and the Now-Problems of
Apocrypha, Inc. and Local 711 - Discovery Procedures in Collective Bargaining
Disputes, 116 U. Pa. L. Rev. 571, 573 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Jones I]. To
preserve its speed and economic efficiency, arbitration is unhampered by many of the
formalities of litigation. For example, the rules of evidence do not apply to arbitral
hearings. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 n.4 (1956); Burchell v.
Marsh, 58 U.S. 362, 370, 17 How. 344, 352 (1855); Harvey Alum. Inc. v. United
Steelworkers, 263 F. Supp. 488, 491 (C.D. Cal. 1967). An arbitrator may consider
hearsay and other incompetent testimony. Bell Aerospace Co. v. Local 516, Int'l
Union, UAW, 500 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir. 1974); Petroleum Separating Co. v.
Interamerican Ref. Corp., 296 F.2d 124, 124 (2d Cir. 1961) (per curiam); Commer-
cial Solvents Corp. v. Louisiana Liquid Fertilizer Co., 20 F.R.D. 359, 362 (S.D.N.Y.
1957). Arbitrators need not disclose the reasons behind their awards. Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953);
Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Louisiana Liquid Fertilizer Co., 20 F.R.D. 359, 362
(S.D.N.Y. 1957); Shirley Silk Co. v. American Silk Mills, Inc., 257 A.D. 375, 377, 13
N.Y.S.2d 309, 311 (1939). Arbitrators may, in fact, draw on their own personal
experience in making an award. American Almond Prods. Co. v. Consolidated Pecan
Sales Co., 144 F.2d 448, 450 (2d Cir. 1944); Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Louisiana
Liquid Fertilizer Co., 20 F.R.D. 359, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Danneborg v. Strange &
Co., 1 F. Supp. 380, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1932). Arbitrators need not give written opin-
ions. Interinsurance Exch. of the Auto Club v. Bailes, 219 Cal. App. 2d 830, 834, 33
Cal. Rptr. 533, 538 (1963); M. Domke, supra, § 29.06, at 286; Mentschikoff,
Commercial Arbitration, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 846, 865 & n.32 (1961). A written
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speedy and economical mechanism for resolving controversies. 7
Courts feared that by encroaching on arbitral procedure, they would
be creating a hybrid forum, "part judicial and part arbitrational." 8
The separation of the two systems led courts to conclude that parties
agreeing to arbitrate waived their right to all judicial procedures,
including discovery. 9
Commercial arbitration today, however, is a far cry from the gen-
teel spar it was at English common law.' 0 As its use has increased, it
has evolved into a structured format for claim adjudication." Most
parties to arbitration hearings are now represented by counsel,12 the
financial stakes can be large, 13 complex issues can be presented, 4 and
transcript of the proceedings is optional. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S.
198, 204 n.4 (1956); Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Louisiana Liquid Fertilizer Co.,
20 F.R.D. 359, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); A.O. Andersen Trading Co. v. Brimberg, 119
Misc. 784, 784, 197 N.Y.S. 289, 290 (Sup. Ct. 1922). To ensure finality, an arbitra-
tion award is subject to being vacated only on very limited grounds. Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953);
Riverboat Casino, Inc. v. Local Joint Exec. Bd., 578 F.2d 250, 251 (9th Cir. 1978).
7. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953); Burton v. Bush, 614 F.2d 389,
391 (4th Cir. 1980); Coastal States Trading, Inc. v. Zenith Nay. S.A., 446 F. Supp.
330, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Dickstein v. duPont, 320 F. Supp. 150, 154 (D. Mass.
1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 783 (1st Cir. 1971); United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic
Co., 93 N.M. 105, 114, 597 P.2d 290, 299, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 911 (1979);Ments-
chikoff, supra note 6, at 849. But see Costikyan, Some Observations on Arbitration,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 27, 1964, at 1, col. 4 (claiming that arbitration can be lengthy, costly
and render unfair results).
8. Cavanaugh v. McDonnell & Co., 357 Mass. 452, 457, 258 N.E.2d 561, 564
(1970); accord Lutz Eng'g Co. v. Sterling Eng'g & Constr. Co., 112 R.I. 605, 610,
314 A.2d 8, 11 (1974).
9. Ferro Union Corp. v. SS Ionic Coast, 43 F.R.D. 11, 13 (S.D. Tex. 1967);
Penn Tanker Co. v. C.H.Z. Rolimpex, Warszawa, 199 F. Supp. 716, 718 (S.D.N.Y.
1961); Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Louisiana Liquid Fertilizer Co., 20 F.R.D.
359, 361-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Katz v. Burkin, 3 A.D.2d 238, 239, 160 N.Y.S.2d 159,
161 (1957) (per curiam); Harleysville Mut. Casualty Co. v. Adair, 421 Pa. 141, 144,
218 A.2d 791, 794 (1966). The court in Commercial Solvents stated: "By voluntarily
becoming a party to a contract in which arbitration was the agreed mode for settling
disputes thereunder respondent chose to avail itself of procedures peculiar to the
arbitral process rather than those used in judicial determinations." 20 F.R.D. at 361.
10. See Jones, The Accretion of Federal Power in Labor Arbitration- The Exam-
ple of Arbitral Discovery, 116 U. Pa. L. Rev. 830, 837 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Jones II].
11. See Commercial Arbitration Rules (1981) (Am. Arb. Ass'n); Mentschikoff,
supra note 6, at 862-65.
12. Mentschikoff, supra note 6, at 859-60; see Commercial Arbitration Rules
(1981) (Am. Arb. Ass'n).
13. E.g., Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 280 F.2d 915, 918 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 911 (1960); Mississippi Power Co. v. Peabody Coal Co.,
69 F.R.D. 558, 559 (S.D. Miss. 1976); United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co.,
93 N.M. 105, 113, 597 P.2d 290, 298, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 911 (1979).
14. E.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 396-97
(1967); Fallick v. Kehr, 369 F.2d 899, 901 (2d Cir. 1966); Levin v. Ripple Twist
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hearings can be lengthy, even lasting years.' 5 In applying the strict
necessity test, modern courts fear that the delay and costs incident to
discovery will undercut the speed and economy of arbitration.'0 This
Note, in examining decisions on discovery in commercial arbitration,
contends that the historical considerations are no longer valid and that
the practical concerns are greatly exaggerated. It concludes that
courts should discard the presumption against pre-arbitral discovery,
lower the strict necessity standard, and engage in a true balancing of
the benefits derived from discovery against an), expenditures of time
and money that it requires. Discovery does not necessarily defeat the
speed and economy of arbitration and may, in fact, make it a more
equitable process.
I. THE STmicT NECESSIry TEST
The New York Appellate Division first formulated the strict neces-
sity test in Katz v. Burkin. '7  The reason behind the adoption of the
test was twofold. First, court interference was deemed incompatible
with arbitration: "Arbitration is subject to its own rules and practices
at variance with court procedures. It is supposed to be a complete
proceeding, without resort to court facilities, for handling and dispos-
ing of a controversy."' 8 Second, the court reasoned that because of
the pronounced differences bet-ween the two systems, a party, by
deliberately choosing to arbitrate, also committed himself to abide by
arbitral procedure and thereby waived all access to the court fo-
rum.' 9 Because arbitrators have no common-law right to order dis-
covery,20 this reasoning virtually eliminated the possibility of obtain-
ing any pre-hearing discovery.2'
Mills, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 876, 881 (E.D. Pa. 1976); United Nuclear Corp. v. General
Atomic Co., 93 N.M. 105, 110, 597 P.2d 290, 295, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 911 (1979).
15. Jones, Three Centuries of Commercial Arbitration in New York: A Brief
Survey, 1956 Wash. U.L.Q. 193, 193 (1956); see, e.g., Nederlandse Erst-Tankers-
maatschappij v. Isbrandtsen Co., 362 F.2d 205, 205 (2d Cir. 1966); Ballantine
Books, Inc. v. Capital Distrib. Co., 302 F.2d 17, 18 (2d Cir. 1962).
16. E.g., Burton v. Bush, 614 F.2d 389, 391 (4th Cir. 1980); Coastal States
Trading, Inc. v. Zenith Nay. S.A., 446 F. Supp. 330, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Missis-
sippi Power Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 69 F.R.D. 558, 567 (S.D. Miss. 1976):
Dickstein v. duPont, 320 F. Supp. 150, 154 (D. Mass. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 783 (1st
Cir. 1971).
17. 3 A.D.2d 238, 160 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1957) (per curiam). The court stated: '\e
are of the view that examinations before trial under court aegis should not be granted
in [aid of arbitration] except under extraordinary circumstances .... Necessity
rather than convenience should be the test." Id. at 238-39, 160 N.Y.S.2d at 160-61.
18. Id., 160 N.Y.S.2d at 161.
19. Id.
20. Tobey v. Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1320 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065); In
re Sun-Ray Cloak Co., 256 A.D. 620, 623, 11 N.Y.S.2d 202, 205 (1939).
21. Few states give arbitrators the power to order discovery. See, e.g., Cal. Civ.
Proc. Code § 1283,05(a) (West Supp. 1981); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 5-407(b) (1975); Tex.
Stat. Ann. art. 230(B) (Vernon 1973).
1982] 1451
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
The historical bases for restricting discovery, however, bear little
relationship to the realities of present day arbitration. Whereas at
common law the judiciary exhibited hostility toward arbitration, 22
today there is a federal judicial policy favoring arbitration.2 3  Al-
though courts historically refused to enforce agreements to arbitrate
future disputes2 4 and pronounced broad arbitration agreements void
as against public policy, 25 arbitration clauses are now interpreted
more broadly.26  Modern day courts do not lightly infer that a party
has waived the right to arbitrate.2 7 There also presently exists elabo-
rate interplay between the two systems. 28 If arbitration is required,
22. See Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 406-07
(2d Cir. 1959), cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960); Kulukundis Shipping Co. v.
Amtorg Trading Corp., [26 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942); M. Domke, supra note 6, §
3.01, at 17.
23. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519-20 (1974); Carcich v.
Rederi A/B Nordie, 389 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1968); Weight Watchers of Quebec
Ltd. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 1057, 1058 (E.D.N.Y. 1975);
Address by Chief Justice Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary,
Midyear Meeting of the American Bar Association, Chicago, Illinois (Jan. 24, 1982),
reprinted in 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (Mar. 1982). In 1981, the American Arbitration
Association reported 5,733 claims filed, up almost 200 % from the 1,964 claims filed
in 1961. Am. Arb. Ass'n. Office Circular, summary of arbitration claims filed (Nov.
1981). From 1957 to 1967, commercial claims jumped from 645 per year to 1,588 per
year. M. Bernstein, Private Dispute Settlement 17 (1978) (quoting figures from Am.
Arb. Ass'n, Arbitration News no. 2 (1968); Am. Arb. Ass'n, Arbitration News no. 3
(1967)).
24. Greason v. Keteltas, 14 N.Y. 491, 496 (1858); see Kulukundis Shipping Co. v.
Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942); S.M. Wolff Co. v. Tulkoff,
9 N.Y.2d 356, 362, 214 N.Y.S.2d 374, 377 (1961). At common law, agreements to
arbitrate future disputes were revocable at will. Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20
Wall.) 445, 451 (1874); Kulukundis Shipping Co. .v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126
F.2d 978, 984 (2d Cir. 1942); N.P. Sloan Co. v. Standard Chem. & Oil Co., 256 F.
451, 454 (5th Cir. 1918). The aggrieved party, however, could sue the revoking party
for damages for breach of the agreement to arbitrate. Aktieselskabet Korn-Og Foder-
stof Kompagniet v. Rederiaktiebolage Atlanten, 250 F. 935, 937 (2d Cir. 1918),
aff'd, 252 U.S. 313 (1920); Munson v. Straits of Dover S.S. Co., 99 F. 787, 789
(S.D.N.Y. 1900).
25. See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983
(2d Cir. 1942); United States Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222
F. 1006, 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
26. E.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 406
(1967); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960); Fallick
v. Kehr, 369 F.2d 899, 903-04 (2d Cir. 1966).
27. E.g., Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 1981);
Midwest Window Sys., Inc. v. Amcor Indus. Inc., 630 F.2d 535, 536 (7th Cir. 1980):
Demsey & Assocs. v. S.S. Sea Star, 461 F.2d 1009, 1018 (2d Cir. 1972); General
Guar. Ins. Co. v. New Orleans Gen. Agency, Inc., 427 F.2d 924, 930 (5th Cir.
1970); Hilti, Inc. v. Oldach, 392 F.2d 368, 371-72 (1st Cir. 1968); Carcich v. Rederi
A/B Nordie, 389 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1968); Cornell & Co. v. Barber & Ross Co.,
360 F.2d 512, 513 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (per curiam); Clar Prod. Ltd. v. Isram Motion
Picture Prod. Servs. Inc., 529 F. Supp. 381, 382-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
28. Bigge Crane & Rigging Co. v. Docutel Corp., 371 F. Supp. 240, 246
(E.D.N.Y. 1973); see M. Domke, supra note 6, §§ 17.0.1-18.06, at 154-78.
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courts are willing to lend their assistance in facilitating it. They grant
provisional remedies, 29 compel arbitration, 30 consolidate arbitration
claims 3I and appoint an arbitrator if the parties cannot agree on
one.32  Courts can also compel the attendance of witnesses and pro-
duction of documents, 33 and give effect to arbitral decisions by con-
firming,34 vacating, 35 modifying 36 and enforcing awards. 37  This in-
29. E.g., Carolina Power & Light Co. %. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044, 1051 (N.D.
Cal. 1977) (prejudgment attachment); Coastal States Trading, Inc. v. Zenith Nay.,
S.A., 446 F. Supp. 330, 332-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)(same): EFC Dev. Corp. v. F.F.
Baugh Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 24 Ariz. App. 566, 568, 540 P.2d 185, 188 (1975)
(mechanic's lien); A. Sangivanni & Sons v. F.M. Floryan & Co., 158 Conn. 467, 474,
262 A.2d 159, 163-64 (1969) (same); Frederick Contractors, Inc. v. Bel Pre Medical
Center, Inc., 274 Md. 307, 315, 334 A.2d 526, 531 (1975)(same): American Reserve
Ins. Co. v. China Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 322, 327, 79 N.E.2d 425, 427 (1948)(attach-
ment); American Eutectic Welding Alloys Sales Co. v. Flynn, 399 Pa. 617, 623, 161
A.2d 364, 367 (1960)(preliminary injunction).
30. E.g., Mercury Constr. Co. v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 656 F.2d 933,
941-42 (4th Cir. 1981)(en bane); McAllister Bros., Inc. v. A & S Transp. Co., 621
F.2d 519, 524 (2d Cir. 1980): Conticommodity Servs., Inc. v. Phillip & Lion, 613
F.2d 1222, 1227 (2d Cir. 1980); Louis Dreyfus Corp. v. Cook Indus., Inc., 505 F.
Supp. 4, 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
31. E.g., Compania Espanola de Petroleos S.A. v. Nereus Shipping S.A., 527
F.2d 966, 972-75 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976): Robinson %,.
Warner, 370 F. Supp. 828, 829 (D.R.I. 1974); Vigo S.S. Corp. v. Marship Corp., 26
N.Y.2d 157, 162, 257 N.E.2d 624, 626, 309 N.Y.S.2d 165, 168, cert. denied, 400 U.S.
819 (1970); see M. Domke, supra note 6, § 27.02. at 272-74.
32. E.g., Chattanooga Mailers Union v. Chattanooga News-Free Press Co., 524
F.2d 1305, 1315 (6th Cir. 1975); Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. United Mine Workers,
494 F.2d 726, 740 (3d Cir. 1974); Astra Footwear Indus. v. HarwN.n Int'l Inc., 442 F.
Supp. 907, 910-11 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1978); Zandman v.
Nissenbaum, 53 A.D.2d 837, 838, 385 N.Y.S.2d 562, 563 (1976).
33. E.g., Western Employers Ins. Co. v. Merit Ins. Co., 492 F. Supp. 53, 55
(N.D. Ill. 1979); Local Lodge 1746, Int'l Assoc. of Machinists v. Pratt & Whitney
Div. of United Aircraft Corp., 329 F. Supp. 283. 286 (D. Conn. 1971).
34. E.g., International Produce, Inc. v. A/S Rosshavet, 638 F.2d 548, 552 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3006 (1981): John T. Brady & Co. v. Fori-Eze Sys.,
Inc., 623 F.2d 261, 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1062 (1980); Reed &
Martin, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 439 F.2d 1268, 1278 (2d Cir. 1971);
Smith v. La Cote Basque, 519 F. Supp. 663. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1981): Puerto Rico
Maritime Shipping Auth. v. Star Lines, Ltd., 496 F. Supp. 14, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Maidman v. O'Brien, 473 F. Supp. 25, 28-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
35. Milwaukee Typographical Union v. Newspapers, Inc., 639 F.2d 386, 394
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 144 (1981): Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v.
North Am. Towing, Inc., 607 F.2d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1979): Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Local Joint Exec. Bd., 486 F. Supp. 675, 684 (D. Nev. 1980). Arbitral awards may
only be vacated on the grounds specified by statute. General Tel. Co. v. Communi-
cations Workers, 648 F.2d 452, 456 (6th Cir. 1981): Diapulse Corp. of Am. v. Carba,
Ltd., 626 F.2d 1108, 1110 (2d Cir. 1980). The Federal Arbitration Act specifies four
grounds for vacating an award: -'(a) Where the award was procured by corruption,
fraud, or undue means. (b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them. (c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
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terplay between the two systems has created a mutually dependent
relationship. Courts legitimize arbitration,38 and arbitration helps the
court system by lightening its caseload.
39
The historical distinction between the court and arbitral systems
has therefore lost its vitality. Because the two systems are no longer
separate and incompatible, the presumption that a party, in selecting
one, waives the procedures of the other is unfounded.40 That parties
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced. (d) Where the arbitrators
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." 9 U.S.C. § 10
(1976). Similar grounds are set forth in state statutes. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law
§ 7511(b) (McKinney 1980); Unif. Arb. Act § 12(a), 7 U.L.A. 55 (1978). Similar
grounds also exist at common law. See Salt Lake Pressmen, Local Union No. 28 v.
Newspaper Agency Corp., 485 F. Supp. 511, 515 (D. Utah 1980). Courts are reluc-
tant to find grounds for vacating arbitral awards. Gibbons v. United Transp. Union,
462 F. Supp. 838, 842 (N.D. Ill. 1978); see, e.g., General Tel. Co. v. Communica-
tions Workers, 648 F.2d 452, 457 (6th Cir. 1981) (labor award upheld even though
the remedy granted was not specifically authorized); Cobec Brazilian Trading &
Warehousing Corp. v. Isbrandtsen, 524 F. Supp. 7, 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (award not
vacated even though arbitrator's opinion was clearly erroneous both in logic and in
fact); Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Liang, 493 F. Supp. 104, 107-09 (N.D. Ill.
1980) (award upheld although there was no evidence to support it), aff'd, 653 F.2d
310 (7th Cir. 1981); Jarrell v. Wilson Warehouse Co., 490 F. Supp. 412, 417 (M.D.
La. 1980) (award upheld although arbitrator exceeded his authority in deciding an
issue).
36. E.g., South E. Atl. Shipping Ltd. v. Garnac Grain Co., 356 F.2d 189, 193
(2d Cir. 1966); Ramonas v. Kerelis, 102 Ill. App. 2d 262, 275, 243 N.E.2d 711, 718
(1968); Weiss v. Metalsalts Corp., 15 A.D.2d 46, 48, 222 N.Y.S.2d 7, 8 (1961) (per
curiam), aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d 1042, 183 N.E.2d 913, 230 N.Y.S.2d 32 (1962).
37. E.g., Boston Shipping Assoc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 659
F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1981); New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers, 626
F.2d 455, 468 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom. Jacksonville Bulk Terminals,
Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981); Jarrell v. Wilson
Warehouse Co., 490 F. Supp. 412, 417 (M.D. La. 1980); Chillum-Adelphi Volunteer
Fire Dep't v. Button & Goode, Inc., 242 Md. 509, 517-18, 219 A.2d 801, 806-07
(1966); Plein v. Charchat. 53 Misc. 2d 162, 164-65, 277 N.Y.S.2d 862, 864-65 (1966).
38. Mentschikoff, supra note 6, at 858; see M. Domke, supra note 6, § 37.01, at
325.
39. Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 410 (2d
Cir. 1959), cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960); Tepper Realty Co. v. Mosaic Tile
Co., 259 F. Supp. 688, 693 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); United Nuclear Corp. v. General
Atomic Co., 93 N.M. 105, 114, 597 P.2d 290, 299, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 911 (1979).
40. If a party availed himself of court procedures, he could be deemed to have
waived the right to arbitrate. Courts, however, have been reluctant to find waiver.
See, e.g., Demsey & Assocs. v. S.S. Sea Star, 461 F.2d 1009, 1017-18 (2d Cir. 1972)
(waiver found when a party participated fully in discovery, filed cross-claims and
went to trial on the merits); Cornell & Co. v. Barber & Ross Co., 360 F.2d 512, 513
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (per curiam) (wavier found where a party moved to transfer venue,
filed an answer and counterclaim, and participated in discovery); Kulukundis Ship-
ping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 989 n.40 (2d Cir. 1942) (improper
for a party to commence a court action and then request arbitration if it wants to
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have signed an agreement to arbitrate does not necessarily indicate an
affirmative decision to forego discovery. There may be another con-
tractual provision, other legal duties of disclosure or statements made
during negotiations that rebut the presumption of waiver. 4  But even
when an arbitration agreement contains a discovery provision, some
courts have disregarded it for fear that the time and costs of discovery
will defeat the practical purposes of arbitration. 42
II. LOWERING THE STRucT NECESSITY STANDARD
In Bigge Crane & Rigging Co. v. Docutel Corp. , ' the District
Court for the Eastern District of New York shifted the focus from
avail itself of the provisional remedies not available in arbitration). The court's
hesitancy to find that a party has waived the right to arbitrate is not based on a desire
to preserve the separation of court and arbitral forums. Instead, it is grounded in
contract law. The federal policy favoring arbitration, see supra note 23 and accom-
panying text, dictates that when courts construe arbitration agreements, they resolve
all doubts in favor of arbitration. Dickinson v. Heinold Sees., Inc., 661 F.2d 638. 643
(7th Cir. 1981); Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1976):
Controlled Sanitation Corp. v. District 128 of Int'l Ass'n of Machinists. 524 F.2d
1324, 1328 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 915 (1976).
41. Jones II, supra note 10, at 835-36. Professor Jones has stated that the pre-
sumption of waiver begs four fundamental questions: '(a) Have the parties, by
executing an arbitration agreement containing no reference to discovery procedures,
necessarily demonstrated their intent never to be compelled to make disclosure
through discovery in connection with disputes arising under the agreement? (b)
During negotiations, were there situations foreseeable from which an inference
might reasonably be drawn that they contemplated an obligation of disclosure? (c)
Are there contractual provisions, aside from the arbitration provision, which lead to
the conclusion that disclosure is an enforceable contractual commitment? (d) Are
there obligations of disclosure imposed by lav which warrant the conclusion that
they are implicitly integrated as contractual commitments?" Id.
42. Motor Vehicle Accid. Indemnif. Corp. v. McCabe, 19 A.D.2d 349, 353, 243
N.Y.S.2d 495, 499 (1963) (Although arbitration agreement contained a discovery
provision, the court stated that -[c]ourt action, having a tendency to interfere with
the prerogatives of the arbitrators or to delay their proceedings is not justified except
where shown to be absolutely necessary for the protection of the rights of a party."):
Harleysville Mutual Casualty Co. v. Adair, 421 Pa. 141, 145, 218 A.2d 791, 794
(1966) (Although arbitration agreement contained a discovery provision, the court
stated that "[t]o hold that all arbitration proceedings must be considered subject to
[discovery rules] would eliminate, or at least severely curtail, arbitration as a means
of facilitating the solution of disputes."). Other courts, however, have upheld discov-
ery provisions in arbitration agreements. See supra note 1.
43. 371 F. Supp. 240 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). The dispute arose between a subcontrac-
tor and a general contractor who was to install a baggage-handling system at an
airport terminal. The plaintiff-subcontractor had completed 99 % of the work under
one subcontract, and 100% of the work under another subcontract, but the defend-
ants failed to pay money due to the plaintiff for work done and refused to provide a
schedule for the completion of the work remaining. The plaintiff left the job site
because of defendant's unexplained breaches and commenced a court action for
damages. Id. at 242.
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historical to practical concerns and looked to whether discovery could
be had while still preserving the speed and economy that arbitration
was intended to provide. 44 In Bigge Crane, the plaintiff subcontrac-
tor sued the defendant general contractor for payment due on work
performed. 45  The plaintiff requested discovery, contending that he
needed to know the basis of the general contractor's defense. 40  The
court considered the strict necessity test in light of the federal policy
favoring arbitration.47  The need for the information sought was
balanced against the practical considerations of time and cost. The
court found that discovery could be had without delaying the arbitral
process because months would elapse before the parties chose their
arbitrators, and that the amount in controversy was so large that the
costs of discovery would be slight by comparison. 48 In addition, the
court stated that "discovery is particularly necessary in a case where
the claim is for payment for work done and virtually completed, and
the nature of any defense is unknown. ' 49 Because discovery would
therefore assist arbitration in this case, it was viewed as consistent
with the federal policy.
The necessity inquiry was thus reduced to one factor out of several
in the analysis, 50 rather than being the focus as it was in Katz. 5' In
addition, it is questionable whether the facts really indicate that
discovery was "particularly necessary." 52 To prepare for arbitration
the plaintiff only had to prove the satisfactory completion of the work
and the contract terms.5 3 Pre-trial discovery of the elements of the
general contractor's defense, while helpful to the plaintiff, would not
have been sufficiently crucial to the plaintiff's preparation of his case
to satisfy the strict necessity test.5 4 Because time and costs were not
adversely affected, however, the standard of necessity was lowered.5
44. Id. at 246.
45. Id. at 242.
46. Id. at 242-43.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 246.
50. See id.
51. See Katz v. Burkin, 3 A.D.2d 238, 239, 160 N.Y.S.2d 159, 161 (1957) (per
curiam); supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
52. See Note, Court May Permit Discovery on the Merits When it Will Not Delay
Arbitration, 44 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 151, 155-56 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Discovery
Will Not Delay Arbitration].
53. Id.; see Bigge Crane & Rigging Co. v. Docutel Corp., 371 F. Supp. 240, 242
(E.D.N.Y. 1973).
54. Discovery Will Not Delay Arbitration, supra note 52, at 154-56. The Note
points out the liberality of the Bigge Crane holding by analyzing each element of its
test. First , since the action was for work completed and not compensated, it was
unnecessary for plaintiff to know the nature of the general contractor's defense to
prepare for the hearing. Id. at 155. Second, delay posed no considerable impediment
because months would elapse between the time the party filed the arbitration claim
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Commentators predicted that Bigge Crane would herald a new,
more lenient attitude on the part of courts toward pre-arbitral discov-
ery. 56 Yet most courts still apply the strict necessity test,S" with some
expressly adhering to the concern that discovery will defeat the speed
and economy of arbitration. 58  The few courts that have cited Bigge
Crane have either required or, although not expressly requiring, have
found extraordinary circumstances. 9
In Vespe Contracting Co. v. Anvan Corp.,60 for example, the court
ordered discovery because the defendant's activities would have made
pertinent evidence unavailable before the action could be brought to
arbitration.6 1  In Bergen Shipping Co. v. Japan Marine Services,
and the time the arbitrators were chosen. Id. In the meantime. discovery could
proceed under court aegis without any resulting delay in the arbitral process. Id.
Finally, the slight cost of discovery, compared with a large amount of money at
stake, is another simple criterion to meet. Most commercial cases reaching the trial
stage will involve large amounts of money. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
Discovery can be expensive, but rarely will it approximate the size of normal com-
mercial claims. Discovery Will Not Delay Arbitration, supra note 52, at 155-56.
55. Discovery Will Not Delay Arbitration, supra note 52, at 155. The author
equates the Bigge Crane test with the relevancy test for discoverable matters under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Discovery Will Not Delay Arbitration, supra note 52, at
151.
56. Willenken I, supra note 1, at 179; Discovery Will Not Delay Arbitration,
supra note 52, at 156.
57. E.g., Burton v. Bush, 614 F.2d 389, 391 (4th Cir. 1980): Coastal States
Trading, Inc. v. Zenith Nav. S.A., 446 F. Supp. 330, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1977): Levin v.
Ripple Twist Mills, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 876, 880-81 (E.D. Pa. 1976): Bergen Shipping
Co. v. Japan Marine Servs., Ltd., 386 F. Supp. 430, 435 & n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); De
Sapio v. Kohlmeyer, 35 N.Y.2d 402, 406, 321 N.E.2d 770, 773, 362 N.Y.S.2d 843,
847 (1974); International Components Corp. v. Klaiber, 54 A.D.2d 550, 551, 387
N.Y.S.2d 253, 255 (1976); Gelbfish v. Castellucci, 46 A.D.2d 863, 863, 361 N.Y.S.2d
672, 672 (1974) (per curiam); Lutz Eng'g Co. v. Sterling Eng'g & Constr. Co., 112
R.I. 605, 610, 314 A.2d 8, 11 (1974): Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. Commercial Metals
Co., 93 Wash. 2d 199, 204, 607 P.2d 856, 859 (1980) (en banc).
58. Burton v. Bush, 614 F.2d 389, 391 (4th Cir. 1980) (dictum); Coastal States
Trading, Inc. v. Zenith Nay. S.A., 446 F. Supp. 330, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
59. E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Potlatch Corp., 462 F. Supp. 694, 695 n.1 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (cites Bigge Crane as requiring extraordinary circumstances); Levin v. Ripple
Twist Mills, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 876, 880 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (same), Vespe Contracting
Co. v. Anvan Corp., 399 F. Supp. 516, 522 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (facts of case reflect
extraordinary circumstances); Bergen Shipping Co. v. Japan Marine Servs., Ltd.,
386 F. Supp. 430, 435 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (Bigge Crane requires exceptional circum-
stances). But see Leo Nash Steel Corp. v. D.M.C. Constr. Corp., N.Y.L.J., July o8,
1977, at 11, col. 6 (Sup. Ct.) (although not citing Bigge Crane. discovery ordered
because of sizeable sums involved, complexity of claims and type of proof to be
adduced).
60. 399 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
61. Id. at 522. The court observed: "'As progess continues at the construction site,
evidence of Vespe's performance of the concrete work is "disappearing" behind the
hotel's interior and exterior wall coverings. For all practical purposes, Vespe's work
product will be inaccessible for future inspections." Id.
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Ltd. ,62 the court affirmed a discovery order because the crew mem-
bers to be deposed were about to leave the United States and be
reassigned to vessels in international commerce.03  Although both
courts cited Bigge Crane,6 4 these holdings do not depart in substance
from previous cases that granted discovery because of the "necessity"
of seizing evidence that would soon be unavailable.65 A closer exami-
nation of the effects of discovery in arbitration reveals that courts have
failed to recognize the import of Bigge Crane's holding. Extraordinary
circumstances should not be arbitrarily required because only in the
unusual case will discovery appreciably lengthen the arbitral process
or significantly raise its costs.
There is no doubt that discovery takes up time in the pre-hearing,
preparation phase of arbitration. 6  Attorneys need time to attend
depositions, to draft and respond to interrogatories, and to request
and produce documents.6 7 Although discovery may initially lengthen
the arbitral process, however, it clearly saves time at the hearing.
While in many states arbitrators have the power to subpoena docu-
ments and witnesses to appear at the hearing,68 they cannot use this
power to subpoena documents and witnesses for pre-hearing examina-
tion.69 If a court does not order discovery, therefore, much time is
wasted at the hearing as each side sifts through documents and exam-
ines witnesses for the first time,70 groping for evidence that may not be
62. 386 F. Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
63. Id. at 435 n.8.
64. Vespe Contracting Co. v. Anvan Corp., 339 F. Supp. 516, 522 (E.D. Pa.
1975); Bergen Shipping Co. v. Japan Marine Servs., Ltd., 386 F. Supp. 430, 435 n.8
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
65. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
66. See Developments in the Law - Discovery, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 940, 943 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Developments]; cf. P. Connolly, E. Hollemann & M. Kuhlman,
Judicial Controls and the Civil Litigative Process: Discovery 54-55 (Federal Judicial
Center 1978) (reporting the results of a six-district survey which found that an
average of 176 days elapsed between the filing of the first discovery request and the
conclusion of discovery when judges used strong controls over the process.)
67. See Mississippi Power Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 69 F.R.D. 558, 567 (S.D.
Miss. 1976); United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 93 N.M. 105, 117, 597
P.2d 290, 302, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 911 (1979); Developments, supra note 66, at
943.
68. E.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1282.6 (West 1972); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law §
7505 (McKinney 1980); Unif. Arb. Act § 7, 7 U.L.A. 44 (1978). The Uniform
Arbitration Act has been adopted by 25 states. 1 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 1982). The Federal
Arbitration Act also grants arbitrators subpoena power. 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1976).
69. De Sapio v. Kohlmeyer, 35 N.Y.2d 402, 406, 321 N.E.2d 770, 773, 362
N.Y.S.2d 843, 847 (1974); North Am. Foreign Trading Co. v. Rosen, 58 A.D.2d 527,
527, 395 N.Y.S.2d 194, 195 (1977); 8 J. Weinstein, H. Korn, A. Miller, New York
Civil Practice § 7505.06, at 75-128 (1981).
70. Costikyan, supra note 7, at 1; Kuffler, New York Charter Arbitrations and
Pre-Hearing Discovery: A Concept Whose Time Has Come, Lloyd's Mar. & Com. Q,
557, 561 (Nov. 1978).
1458 [Vol. 50
1982] DISCOVERY IN ARBITRATION 1459
available. 7' Arbitrators have little incentive to limit this practice.72
Parties to arbitration must be given the opportunity to present evi-
dence material to the controversy. 73  In addition, an arbitration
award may be vacated because of the arbitrator's refusal to grant a
continuance to allow a party to counter surprising evidence.74 To
avoid the danger of having an award vacated, arbitrators often ad-
journ proceedings to allow parties to marshall more evidence, thus
extending the hearing precisely because information was not made
available in advance. 75
Discovery serves several important functions that are consistent
with the goal of reaching a speedy and inexpensive resolution of
disputes. 76  First, discovery encourages settlement by disclosing each
side's relative strengths and weaknesses. 7  Access to information prior
to the hearing enables parties to narrow the issues by revealing areas
of underlying agreement 7 and eliminating arguments unsupported by
evidence. 79 A greater comprehension of the issues promotes effective
attorney preparation, 0 which fosters a more thorough and organized
presentation of evidence at the hearing. 8' Refined presentations
71. Costikyan, supra note 7, at 1.
72. See M. Hill & A. Sinicropi, Evidence in Arbitration 7 (1980); Costikyan,
supra note 7, at 1. "'Unlike the judicial system, however, arbitrators rarely deny the
parties the opportunity to present evidence on the basis that it is immaterial or
irrelevant. Rather, arbitrators will generally admit the evidence *for what it may be
worth.' " M. Hill & A. Sinicropi, supra, at 7.
73. Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. North Am. Towing, Inc., 607 F.2d 649,
651 (5th Cir. 1979); Citizens Bldg. of W. Palm Beach, Inc. v. WVestern Union Tel.
Co., 120 F.2d 982, 984 (5th Cir. 1941); Seldner Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., '2 F.
Supp. 388, 392 (D. Md. 1938).
74. E.g., 9 U.S.C. § 10(c) (1976); Unif. Arb. Act § 12(a)(4), 7 U.L.A. 55 (1978).
75. M. Bernstein, supra note 23, at 142.
76. See Fed. R. Civ. p. 1 (1976). The purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action." Id.
77. Jones I, supra note 6, at 572; Developments, supra note 66, at 94546. In a
recent state survey, 88% of attorneys surveyed stated that discovery encourages
settlement. Lacy, Discovery Costs in State Court Litigation, 57 Ore. L. Rev. 289,
300 (1978).
78. Developments, supra note 66, at 944; see Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,
501 (1946); Nutt v. Black Hills Stage Lines, Inc., 452 F.2d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 1971);
Roberson v. Great Am. Ins. Cos., 48 F.R.D. 404, 414 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
79. Developments, supra note 66, at 945.
80. Id. at 944; see United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 6S2
(1958); Cine Forty-Second St. Theater Corp. v. Allied Artists Picture Corp., 602
F.2d 1062, 1063 (2d Cir. 1979).
81. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958); Cine
Forty-Second St. Theater Corp. v. Allied Artists Picture Corp., 602 F.2d 1062, 1063
(2d Cir. 1979); Harlem River Consumers Coop., Inc. v. Associated Grocers, 54
F.R.D. 551, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The Supreme Court, in Procter & Gamble, stated
that "pretrial procedures make a trial less a game of blindman's bluff and more a fair
contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent." 356
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should help the arbitrators better comprehend the arguments, and
should therefore expedite decision-making.8 2 As a consequence, deci-
sions should be fairer because they are based on a more thorough
understanding of the relevant facts.83
That discovery will save time in arbitration is better understood
when one considers the unique format of arbitral proceedings. Be-
cause arbitrators are professionals engaged in work outside of arbitra-
tion, hearings are scheduled for their convenience.8 4 Arbitrators are
not required to preside over a dispute for consecutive days until it is
resolved.8 5 They often adjourn hearings to accommodate their own
schedules. 86 With each resumption, memories must be refreshed, so
that each delay is amplified by the need to reconstruct what went
before. 7
When courts apply a strict necessity test for fear of prolonging the
arbitral process, their concerns are exaggerated. Much of the time
required by pre-arbitral discovery is offset by time saved at the hear-
ing. Furthermore, courts should consider that by saving time at the
hearing, advance discovery can also offset arbitration costs.
Discovery necessarily involves certain additional expenses. To con-
duct depositions, draft interrogatories and inspect an opponent's rec-
ords and premises can be costly. 8 The Project for Effective Justice, a
detailed national survey conducted by Columbia University,8" re-
vealed, however, that discovery costs are far more reasonable than is
generally thought9" and represent only about thirty percent of total
litigation costs.91 Although the total costs of arbitration will differ
U.S. at 682. The court in Cine stated that the discovery rules transform "the sporting
trial-by-surprise into a more reasoned search for truth." 602 F.2d at 1063.
82. Developments, supra note 66, at 945.
83. W. Glaser, Pretrial Discovery and the Adversary System 115 (1968); Lacy,
supra note 77, at 290; Developments, supra note 66, at 942, 944; see Jones, The
Labor Board, the Courts, and Arbitration-A Feasibility Study of Tribunal Interac-
tion in Grievable Refusals to Disclose, 116 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1185, 1188 (1968) [herein-
after cited as Jones III].
84. See Commercial Arbitration Rules rule 21, at 7-8 (1981) (Am. Arb. Ass'n).
85. See id.; Costikyan, supra note 7, at 1.
86. Costikyan, supra note 7, at 1.
87. Id. The same problem occurs in the federal courts with interlocutory appeals.
Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 351, 351-52 (1961).
"Since substantial time elapses before appellate determination, it would be necessary
for the trial court to spend extra hours refamiliarizing itself with the case." Id.
(footnote omitted); see 15 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 3907, at 431 (1976).
88. See W. Glaser, supra note 83, at 164-65; Lacy, supra note 77, at 295.
89. W. Glaser, supra note 83, at 42-44.
90. Id. at 162-68. Other studies have yielded similar conclusions, Lacy, supra
note 77, at 293-300; Speck, The Use of Discovery in United States District Courts, 60
Yale L.J. 1132, 1150 (1951).
91. W. Glaser, supra note 83, at 181. The survey revealed that plaintiffs spent
19% and defendants spent 23% of total litigation costs on conducting discovery.
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from those of litigation, 92 this thirty percent figure does indicate that
discovery costs are generally contained. In fact, over thirty percent of
attorneys surveyed reported that discovery actually reduced litigation
costs. 93 More significantly, the survey revealed that average discov-
ery costs remain proportionate to the amount of recovery expected, 94
representing from two to five percent of expected return.9
Discovery expenses remain reasonable because most of the costs are
borne by the party requesting it.9 6  That party pays for the most
expensive discovery device, the fees of depositions."7  He must also
bear the cost of his attorney's time in drafting written interrogatories"
and requests for admissions.99 In addition, the discovering part)
Plaintiffs spent 33% and defendants spent 361 , of total litigation costs in both
conducting and responding to discovery,. Id.
92. For the components of litigation costs, see E. Johnson, Access to Justice in the
United States: The Economic Barriers and Some Promising Solutions. in I Access to
Justice Book 915, 920-25 (M. Cappelletti & B. Gordon eds. 1978): Silverstein, Waiver
of Court Costs and Appointment of Counselfor Poor Persons in Civil Cases, 2 Val. U.
L. Rev. 21, 40-42 (1967). For the components of arbitration costs, see Commercial
Arbitration Rules 15 (1981) (Am. Arb. Ass'n).
93. W. Glaser, supra note 83, at 178-79 (29', of defendants' attorneys and 39"
of plaintiffs' attorneys reported that the net effect of discovery was to reduce total
litigation costs); see Wright, Wegner & Richardson, The Practicing Attorney's View
of the Utility of Discovery. 12 F.R.D. 97. 103 (1951) ("Depositions if well taken
greatly reduce trial expense in most cases and often make trial unnecessary when
otherwise absolutely imperative.' " (quoting an attorney surveyed)).
94. W. Glaser, supra note 83. at 171. Other studies have confirmed this. E.g.,
Lacy, supra note 77, at 293-98; Wright, Wegner & Richardson, supra note 93, at
103. Most attorneys feel that the value of discovery is commensurate with its expense.
Id.
95. W. Glaser, supra note 83, at 171. A later Oregon state survey reveals similar
figures. Lacy, supra note 77, at 294-97.
96. See W. Glaser, supra note 83. at 168-69: Wright, Wegner & Richardson,
supra note 93, at 102: Developments, supra note 66, at 972-73.
97. Developments, supra note 66, at 972-73. The greatest expenses in conducting
depositions are attorney's fees, travel expenses, attendance fees of the presiding
officer and of the stenographic reporter, and transcript fees. Id. at 972. Tradition-
ally, the costs of the deposition are borne by the party requesting it. Id. at 972-73.
But courts do have the discretion to allocate expenses otherwise. Gibson v. Interna-
tional Freighting Corp., 8 F.R.D. 487, 488 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (per curiam), ajf'd, 173
F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1949). Courts exercise this discretion when one party is abusing the
process or other circumstances exist which make it equitable for the deponent to pay
the costs. E.g., Robbins v. Abrams, 79 F.R.D. 600, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1978): National
Acceptance Co. v. Doede, 78 F.R.D. 333, 337 (\V.D. \W'is. 1978): Havmes v. Smith,
73 F.R.D. 572, 575 (W.D.N.Y. 1976): Terry v. Modern Woodmen, 57 F.R.D. 141,
144 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
98. See Life Music, Inc. v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 16, 25-26 (S.D.N.Y.
1966); New Dyckman Theatre Corp. v. Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., 16 F.R.D.
203, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). It is within the court's discretion to award counsel fees
incurred in answering interrogatories. E.g., Brulotte v. Regimbal, 368 F.2d 1003,
1004 (9th Cir. 1966) (per curiam): Crosley Radio Corp. v. Heib, 40 F. Supp. 261,
263 (S.D. Iowa 1941).
99. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c) (If a party fails to make an admission requested
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 36, and the requesting party later proves the truth of the
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shares the expense of the actual production of documents, assuming
the costs of copying and transportation. 00 As a rule, the discovered
party will have to bear only the expense of producing the original
documents for inspection and for his attorney's assistance in answering
written interrogatories and requests for admission. 10 Because the
discovering party pays more, it would be illogical for him to initiate
unnecessary discovery.
Of course, if one party has substantially more resources to draw
from than does his adversary, he may conduct extensive and unneces-
sary discovery just to force the latter into a settlement.10 2  The court
system, however, is competent to control such abuse. 0 3 In addition,
there is evidence that such abuse occurs rarely. Only eight percent of
attorneys surveyed by the Project for Effective Justice reported that
their adversaries had caused them undue expense in conducting dis-
covery. 10
4
Arbitration necessarily generates less legal fees than does formal
litigation. 10 5  Ironically, however, the direct arbitration costs can be
matter at issue, the requesting party may petition the court to require the responding
party to pay the reasonable fees incurred in proving the matter in question, including
attorney fees).
100. Holland-Am. Merchants Corp. v. Rogers, 23 F.R.D. 267, 269 (S.D.N.Y.
1959) (party requesting document production must pay for copies of documents);
Hefter v. National Airlines, Inc., 14 F.R.D. 78, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (party requesting
inspection of heavy machinery must pay to have it transported to his location, or
must inspect it at the location of the discovered party); Hesch v. Erie R.R., 14
F.R.D. 518, 519 (N.D. Ohio 1952) (discovering party pays for copies of documents);
Barrows v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij, 11 F.R.D. 400, 401 (S.D.N.Y.
1951) (same).
101. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978). The court
stated that "[ulnder [the discovery] rules, the presumption is that the responding
party must bear the expense of complying with discovery requests." Id.
102. Jones II, supra note 10, at 842; see, e.g., Segan v. Dreyfus Corp., 513 F.2d
695, 696 (2d Cir. 1975); Isaac v. Shell Oil Co., 83 F.R.D. 428, 430 (E.D. Mich.
1979); Global Maritime Leasing Panama, Inc. v. M/S N. Breeze, 451 F. Supp. 965,
967 (D.R.I. 1978); Jones v. Holy Cross Hosp. Silver Spring, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 586, 591
(D. Md. 1974); Dalmady v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 62 F.R.D. 157, 158 (D.P.R.
1973).
103. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Rule 26(c) allows the court to make "any order which
justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppres-
sion, or undue burden or expense." Id. Courts often issue such protective orders to
prevent abuse of discovery. E.g., Isaac v. Shell Oil Co., 83 F.R.D. 428, 432 (D.C.
Mich. 1979) (to protect against undue expense); Fishman v. A.H. Riise Gift Shop,
Inc., 68 F.R.D. 704, 705 (D.V.I. 1975) (to prevent discovering party from obtaining
evidence); Jones v. Holy Cross Hosp. Silver Spring, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 586, 591 (D. Md.
1974) (to protect against excessive interrogatories); United States v. 2,001.10 Acres of
Land, More or Less, 48 F.R.D. 305, 308 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (to prevent discovery of
expert witness's testimony); Textured Yarn Co. v. Burkart-Schier Chem. Co., 41
F.R.D. 158, 160 (E.D. Tenn. 1966) (to prevent disclosure of trade secrets).
104. W. Glaser, supra note 83, at 183.
105. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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greater than court costs. For example, administrative fees of the
American Arbitration Association are scaled to the amount in contro-
versy.10 6 In addition, parties pay not only for attorney time, but for
arbitrator time as well.10 7  The American Arbitration Association
recommends paying arbitrators between three and five hundred dol-
lars a day for hearings that last more than two days. 08 When there
are three arbitrators presiding over a hearing, it can become very
expensive to have them look on while attorneys search for information
beneficial to their cause.
Whereas administrative fees will be unaffected by discovery, mov-
ing information searches to the pre-hearing phase will reduce the
potentially onerous fees paid -to arbitrators. The Bigge Crane court
correctly focused on the effect that discovery would have on the speed
and economy of arbitration.109 Arbitration can be an inefficient
process." 0 Requiring a party to establish that information is abso-
lutely necessary to his cause effectively denies the arbitration process
the benefits of discovery. As in litigation, discovery will turn arbitra-
tion "from a process of evasion into one of realization."" 1
CONCLUSION
The reasons behind the strict necessity test are ill-founded. Histori-
cal concerns are no longer valid, and practical concerns are largely
106. The following chart represents the administrative fees charged by the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association for a commercial arbitration hearing:
Amount of Claim Fee
Up to $10,000 317t (minimum $150)
$10,000 to $25,000 $300, plus 2"( of excess
over $10,000
$25,000 to $100,000 $600. plus 1 ' of excess
over $25,000
$100,000 to $200,000 $1350, plus I'-- ", of excess
over $100,000
$200,000 to $5,000,000 $1850, plus ' 4 "- of excess
over $200,000
Where the claim or counterclaim exceeds $5 million an appropriate fee will be.
determined by the AAA. Commercial Arbitration Rules 15 (1981) (Am. Arb. Ass'n).
107. See id. rule 51.
108. Letter from Maureen Crean. Supervisor, Commercial Department, Ameri-
can Arbitration Association (Apr. 2, 1982) (on file at the Fordhan Law Review).
109. See Bigge Crane & Rigging Co. v. Docutel Corp., 371 F. Supp. 240, 246
(E.D.N.Y. 1973).
110. M. Bernstein, supra note 23, at 142: Costikyan, supra note 7. at 1, 4. Phillips,
A General Introduction, 83 U. Pa. L. Rev. 119, 122 (1934).
111. Jones III, supra note 83, at 1188.
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exaggerated. It is possible for courts to order pre-hearing discovery
and still preserve the speed and economy of arbitration. For these
reasons, a finding of extraordinary circumstances should not be neces-
sary before a court orders discovery in aid of arbitration. In abandon-
ing this rigid standard in favor of a balancing test, the Bigge Crane
court adopted a moderate and sensible approach to the question of
court-ordered discovery. In determining whether to order discovery,
courts should look at the particular facts of each case instead of
summarily dismissing such requests. When facts show that no dispro-
portionate expenses or delay will result, discovery should be allowed.
Mary R. D'Agostino
